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Résumé / Abstract
Cet article examine la performance de deux types de politiques, taxes
et réglementation, visant à réduire la consommation de cigarettes et à donner des
incitations à arrêter de fumer (ou à ne pas commencer). L’analyse est basée sur
des données canadiennes au niveau des provinces pour les années 1982-1995.
Nos résultats montrent que la demande de cigarettes est sensible aux
changements de taxe (élasticité de 0,28), mais pas à la réglementation, alors que
des résultats inverses sont observés lorsqu’on examine l’impact des politiques
sur la décision de fumer ou pas.
This paper investigates the relative ability of two anti-smoking
policies, taxes and regulation, in inducing cigarette demand reductions and in
providing incentives to stop smoking (or not to start). The analysis is based on
Canadian data at the provincial level for the period 1982-1995. Our results
show that cigarette demand responds to taxes (elasticity of 0.28), but not to
regulation, while the converse is true for the proportion of smokers in the
population. This suggests that both policies are acting in a complementary
fashion to influence the incidence of smoking.
Mots Clés : Taxes, réglementation, cigarettes, politiques publiques
Keywords : Taxation, regulation, cigarettes, smoking, policy
11. Introduction
Over the last thirty years, numerous studies have established the potential
hazard of cigarettes consumption for smokers (since 1964) and for those
surrounding them (since 1986).  This has led to severe criticisms against
smoking in our society.  In most industrialized countries, governments feel
justified, especially because of the external cost induced by secondary smoke,
to adopt anti-smoking policies.  To serve this purpose, they rely mainly on
taxation and regulation.  In the Canadian context, the following features are
noteworthy: 1) from 1968 to 1991, the increase in provincial and federal
cigarette taxes has been 2400 % and 700 % respectively, while consumer
prices have increased by 330 %; 2) starting in the seventies, municipalities,
provinces and the federal government have regulated smoking in public places
and this regulation has become more severe since the end of the 80’s with a
number of provinces regulating smoking in the workplace; 3) certain
provinces and the federal government (since 1993) have regulated the sale of
cigarettes to teen-agers and 4) since 1988, the federal government has
regulated cigarettes advertisement and labeling.
Are these policy instruments efficient in achieving their goal?  Which one is
better, if any?  Economists have made certain attempts to answer these
important questions.  In particular, a number of studies (to be discussed in
details below) have looked at the impact of changing taxation on cigarette
consumption  (a notable difficulty in these studies is that smuggling activities
can bias the estimates of cigarettes consumption, especially in Canada1).
Certain researchers have examined the relative role of both instruments in
inducing consumption reduction, but this was done in the American context
and limited to certain aspects of regulation.
This paper complements the literature in several ways: 1) it is the first study to
examine the relative role of taxation and regulation in Canada; this is a useful
exercise given that Canada and the U.S. have implemented different sets of
policies against smoking (higher taxes and more stringent regulation on
advertisement and labeling in Canada); 2) our measure of regulation accounts
for all the principal aspects of this kind of policy; 3) for the first time, we use
the proportion of smokers in the population as a measure of the incidence of
smoking (which should not be biased by smuggling); given that one of the
objectives of anti-smoking policies is, not only to induce reductions in
cigarette demand, but also to provide incentives to quit smoking (or not to
start to), looking at the impact of anti-smoking policies on the decision to
smoke or not is of interest in its own sake; and 4) when computing our
estimates of cigarette consumption, we account for smuggling in a more direct
way than previous studies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief
summary of the studies on the impact of different anti-smoking policies.  The
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 This phenomenon was important in the nineties in Canada because of the large difference in
cigarette prices between the U.S. and Canada.
2next section presents our empirical model and data.  Section 4 discusses our
empirical results showing that taxes have an effect on the quantity of cigarettes
smoked, but not on the proportion of smokers, while regulation has opposite
effects (a negative influence on the percentage of smokers but no impact on
cigarettes consumption).  Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2. A brief survey of the literature
A large number of studies have investigated the relation between taxes and
cigarettes consumption (the main features of these studies are reported in
Table 1).  Some of them have also taken into account certain aspects of
regulation.  Essentially, they are based on three different types of models
depending on their treatment of addictive behavior.  First, in the static
model, a standard demand function for cigarettes of the following type is
estimated:
C = F (P, Y, X) (1)
where C is the per capita consumption of cigarettes, P is the real price
(including taxes), Y represents the per capita income and X is a vector of
control variables.  Among these control variables, one generally finds certain
socio-demographic factors such as age, sex, education and race.  Certain
aspects of regulation (including advertisement) have been introduced among
the control variables in a number of papers.  Second, in the model of myopic
addiction, researchers capture addiction by including a lagged consumption
variable in the demand function: the greater is C
-1, the greater should be the
contemporaneous consumption.  The estimated equation is thus:
C = F (P, Y, X, C
-1 ) (2)
Third, Becker and Murphy (1988) have suggested the rational addictive
behavior.  In their model, individuals are rational or farsighted in the sense
that they anticipate the expected future consequences of their current actions.
Consequently, future consumption may affect current consumption:
C = F (P, Y, X, C
-1 , C+1 ) (3)
Another important aspect of modeling has been introduced by Baltagi and
Levin (1986), the impact of smuggling on cigarette consumption.  If one does
not account for this phenomenon, it is possible to overestimate the impact of
price on quantities.  In most American studies which dealt with this issue,
3authors have introduced a variable that captures the prices prevailing in
neighboring states, as a mean to control for biases introduced by smuggling.
In general, the studies on the impact of anti-smoking policies use panel data.
If the unit of observation is the individual, the studies have generally few years
of observation.  If the unit of observation is more aggregate, the studies have
usually longer time series.
Turning to the results obtained, there seems to be a consensus on a price
elasticity of -0.4, which confirms that demand for cigarettes is inelastic.
Concerning the impact of regulation, it seems that the Fairness Doctrine (a law
through which tobacco companies had to finance anti-smoking advertisement)
had a significant negative effect on cigarette consumption (Fujii, 1980, Lewit
et al., 1981, and Baltagi and Levin, 1986) .   The impact of  smoking
regulation in public places and in workplaces is less clear: while Wasserman
et al. (1991) find a strong negative impact, Sung et al. (1994)  detect  no effect
at all, and  two studies (Chaloupka, 1991 and Keeler et al., 1993) find a
negative impact in certain specifications of the estimated model.  Furthermore,
the income elasticity of cigarette demand seems to decrease through time.  It
was positive and significant in the early studies, but it is mostly insignificant in
recent studies.
In terms of the best theoretical model underlying the empirical analyses, there
is no clear agreement.  The static model which was used in early studies seems
less popular.  Moreover, while Becker et al. (1994) and Chaloupka (1994)
provide empirical support for the rational addictive model, Keeler et al (1993)
as well as Sung et al. (1994) present results in line with the myopic addictive
model.  Finally, most studies that have accounted for smuggling have found
significant results indicating that the demand in one American state is
inversely related to the price prevailing in bordering states.
3. Empirical model and data
We use two concepts of smoking incidence : cigarette consumption and the
percentage of smokers in the population.  More precisely, four measures are
considered: 1) per capita cigarette consumption (CONSUMPTION2); 2)
cigarette consumption corrected for smuggling (CONSUMPTION1); 3) the
percentage of the people over 12 who smoke (PERCENT12) and 4) the
percentage of people over 18 who smoke (PERCENT18).  The data cover the
ten Canadian provinces for the period 1980-1995 for the two first equations
and the period 1986-1995 for the two last.  Descriptive statistics related to all
the variables used in the analysis are provided in Table 2.  Most data are
available from Statistic Canada, except for the smuggling estimates (see
below) and the data on the percentages of smokers which are provided by a
private poll firm (Print M Bureau).
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 This is the total consumption divided by the number of people being 12 years old or more.
4Preliminary tests (available upon request) led us to choose the myopic model
of consumption.  In particular, the estimation of the rational addictive model
was difficult because the correlation between the lagged dependent variable
and this variable at t+1 was high (around 0.90 in our first two models).  We
will thus base our estimate on the model represented in the equation (2)3.
Turning to the dependent variables, the CONSUMPTION of cigarettes is
approximated by the shipments of Canadian producers within each province.
To correct for smuggling (CONSUMPTION1), we add to this consumption
an estimate of cigarettes sold illegally within each province each year.  As
shown by certain studies of the Canadian Department of Finance (Department
of Finance, 1993 and Lindquist et al., 1993), cigarette smuggling has started in
Canada between 1983 and 1986, has increased between the years 1986 and
1990, and has been somewhat out of control between 1991 and 1994, when
certain governments decided to reduce taxes.  For the years 1986-1992, we
use the estimates of cigarettes sold illegally provided by Lindquist et al.
(1993)4, estimates that we updated for the years 1993-1994.  This is a more
direct way to account for smuggling than what was done in previous studies.
The other dependent variables (the percentage of smokers in the population)
are found in a survey that has been made by a private firm every year since
1986.
Among the independent variables, we first find the real retail PRICE of
cigarettes.  The estimated coefficient of this variable will inform us on the
impact of changing prices, through taxes, on the quantity consumed and on the
probability to be a smoker.
The next independent variable of interest is our index reflecting the severity of
REGULATION.  This index or scale accounts for all the main aspects of
smoking regulation (regulating smoking in public places, advertisement,
labeling, access to cigarettes for teen-agers).  It is based on Wasserman et al.
(1991) and Keeler et al. (1993), and is intended to capture the differential of
strictness across time and across provinces: a federal regulation that affects all
provinces in a given year shifts the strictness score of all provinces at the same
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 The linear form has been adopted here, but preliminary tests showed that the nature of the results
was unchanged with the semilog or translog functional forms.  Complete results are available upon
request.
    
4
 First, these authors estimate the quantity of non-taxable cigarettes bought by: 1) Canadian
residents coming back from a trip; 2) crew members of Canadian airline companies;  3) diplomates
and 4) members of the army.  Second, they estimate the quantity of exported cigarettes actually
consumed out of Canada.  This amount is then substracted from the total of cigarette exports and
non-taxable sales published by Statistique Canada.  It is assumed that the difference has been
reintroduced illegally in the country.  Lindquist et al. estimate, for instance, that half of the Quebec
market in 1993 was under the control of smugglers in 1993, while Fortin et al. (1996), using a more
precise survey of 5000 individuals, estimate this proportion to 58%.  The estimate we use here may
thus be considered as a lower bound of the actual size of smuggling activities.
5time and with the same magnitude; a new regulation in a particular province in
a given year only affects the score of that province. As an important feature of
this index, note that a province (or a city within a province) is considered to be
stricter the more types of public places it regulates (following previous
studies, provinces which regulate smoking in the workplace are considered the
toughest).  Furthermore, when only a number of cities within a province adopt
certain rules, the index accounts for the proportion of the province’s
population which lives in these cities (for more details, see Leclair, 1997).
Our INCOME measure is the real per capita disposable income in each
province.  Among the control variables, a time TREND has been included to
capture specific influences that could vary through time but not across
provinces (e.g., greater consciousness about the health hazard, change in the
age structure of the population).  Finally, provincial fixed effects are
introduced to capture influences that could vary across provinces but not
through time (e.g., specific anti-smoking campaigns)5.
4. Empirical Results
Four regressions are reported in Table 2.  The first one uses, as the dependent
variable, the consumption of cigarettes not adjusted for smuggling, while the
second one accounts for this adjustment.  The third and fourth regressions are
related to the percentage of smokers: i) in the population of people being 12
years old and more (column (3)) and in the adult population (column (4)).
Equations are estimated using a generalized least-squares (GLS) procedure
based on the cross-sectionally heteroskedastic and time-wise autoregressive
model presented in Kmenta (1986, pp. 616-625).
In the CONSUMPTION equations, the coefficient of the PRICE variable is
negative and significant as expected.  Interestingly, the long-term elasticity is
reduced by more than 50 % (-0.60 in column (1) and -0.28 in column (2)) and
is more in line with the rest of the literature when we consider a more realistic
measure of cigarette consumption that accounts for smuggling (column (2)).
Similarly, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable capturing the
addictive nature of smoking is closer to the trend observed in previous studies
when smuggling is taken into account.  Furthermore, the coefficients of the
REGULATION variables are not of the expected sign, but are not significant
(at the 5% level) in these two equations.
The results for the policy variables are somewhat reversed in the
PERCENTAGE of SMOKERS equations.  Indeed, in these two equations, the
coefficients of the PRICE variable are of the expected sign, but are not
                                                     
    
5
 Note also that two socio-demographic variables were included (one capturing the differences in
the level of education across provinces and one capturing the differences in the age structure), but
none of them was ever significant in our preliminary regressions and thus, the results pertaining to
these variables are not reported here.  Complete results are available upon request.
6significant, while the coefficients of the REGULATION variable are negative
and significant.
Interestingly, these results suggest that cigarettes taxes have an impact on the
quantity of cigarettes smoked but not on the decision to smoke or not, while
regulation has the converse effect6.  This is a new result in the literature.
Many reasons may explain this phenomenon.  First, it is possible that
regulation of smoking (especially in public places) is really carrying the idea
that smoking is socially unacceptable (that it becomes a sin!), which is not
necessarily the case with taxation.  Second, in many jurisdictions where
smoking is prohibited in the workplace, employers often provide workers with
programs and training to stop smoking (for instance, smoking is now
prohibited in all federal buildings and all employees working there were
offered to be involved in an anti-smoking program).  Third, legislations that
limit the access of teen-agers to cigarettes may have had an impact on their
decision to start smoking or not.      
Concerning the other variables included in the regressions, it is noteworthy
that the per capita INCOME has no impact on smoking, which is line with the
most recent literature.  Finally, the TREND variable is everywhere negative
and significant, which may reflect the impact of the increasing awareness
about the hazard of smoking.
5. Conclusion
This paper has investigated the relative ability of two anti-smoking policies,
taxes and regulation, in inducing cigarette demand reductions and in providing
incentives to stop smoking (or not to start to).  The analysis is based on
Canadian data at the provincial level for the period 1982-1995.  Our results
showed that cigarette demand responds to taxes (elasticity of -0.28), but not to
regulation, while the converse is true for the proportion of smokers in the
population.  This suggests that both policies are acting in a complementary
fashion to influence the incidence of smoking.  As a useful extension of this
research, it would be interesting to investigate which regulation measure
(regulating smoking in the workplace, advertisement, or access to cigarettes
for teen-agers) is more powerful.
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 Note that these results are stable when the same sample years are used in each of the four models,
with the exception of the regulation variable that becomes negative and barely significant in the
CONSUMPTION1 equation.
7TABLE 1
Empirical Studies on Anti-Smoking Policies
Authors
Price-
elasticity
Impact of
Regulation Data Model
Thompson and
McLeod (1976)
-.65/-.84 Canadian, yearly,
1950-1973
Static
Fujii (1980) -.45/-.71 Negative impact
of the Fairness
Doctrine
American, yearly,
1929-1973
Partial-
adjustment
model
Lewit et al. (1981) -1.44 Negative impact
of the Fairness
Doctrine
Panel of micro-data
6768 teen-agers
over 4 years
Static
Baltagi and Levin
(1986)
-.22 Negative impact
of the Fairness
Doctrine
46 American states,
yearly,
1969-1980
Partial-
adjustment
model
Wasserman et al.
(1991)
-.23 Negative impact
of regulating
smoking in
public places
Panel of micro data Static
Chaloupka (1991) -.24 Mixed evidence
on the impact of
regulating
smoking in
public places
50 American states
1975-1985
Static
Chaloupka and
Saffer (1992)
-.30/-.45 Panel of micro-data
28 000 persons
over 5 years
Rational
addiction
Ministry of Finance,
Canada (1993)
-.70 Canadian,
quarterly,
1968-1991
Partial-
adjustment
model
Keeler et al. (1993) -.34/-.47 Mixed evidence
on the impact of
regulating
smoking in
public places
Californian,
monthly,
1980-1990
Three models
Sung et al. (1994) -.53/-.63 No impact of
regulation
11 American states,
yearly,
1967-1990
Rational
addiction
Becker et al. (1994) -.40/-.75 50 American states,
yearly,
1955-1985
Rational
addiction
TABLE 2: Incidence of Smoking
Coefficients (t-statistics)
Meana
(standard
deviation)
(1)
CONSUMPTION
N = 150
(2)
CONSUMPTION1
N = 150
(3)
PERCENT12
N = 90
(4)
PERCENT18
N = 90
Logged dependent
variable
0.450
(8.10)
0.608
(9.80)
0.152
(1.56)
0.189
(2.09)
PRICE 118.1
(42.55)
-6.216
(-9.87)
-2.139
(-3.85)
-0.009
(-1.75)
-0.008
(-1.49)
INCOME 12 010
(1 427)
0.044
(1.76)
0.027
(1.07)
0.001
(0.17)
-0.0003
(-0.54)
REGULATION 33.26
(29.86)
1.202
(1.60)
1.247
(1.78)
-0.038
(-3.38)
-0.037
(-3.03)
TREND -33.005
(-3.24)
-37.396
(9.55)
-0.289
(-2.24)
-0.377
(-2.91)
R2 -- 0.94 0.939 0.58 0.62
a The mean and (standard deviation) of the dependent variables are : CONSUMPTION : 2174 (791.5) ;
CONSUMPTION1 : 2284 (715.1) ; PERCENT12 : 28.31 (4.1) and PERCENT18 : 30.54 (4.4).
Dependent
variables
 Independent
 variables
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